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Humanitarian	Metrics	and	Response,	Conflict	Research	Programme,	November	2019.   
36	Alex	de	Waal,	‘Transactional	Politics	and	Humanitarian	Crises:	Lessons	for	Policy’,	forthcoming.  
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economic	deprivation,	war	and	external	shocks.	War	is	the	most	common	cause	of	
humanitarian	emergency	and	famine	in	the	contemporary	world.	The	ways	in	which	war	
causes	starvation	and	famine	are	well-known:	they	include	deliberate	starvation	crimes,	
the	reckless	pursuit	of	war	strategies	that	cause	deprivation	and	hunger,	and	knock-on	
economic	effects.	The	spark	and	escalation	of	war	may	be	unrelated	to	the	political	
marketplace,	but	continuing	war	commonly	leads	to	the	marketization	of	politics.	War	
fighting	is	expensive	and	those	who	organize	it	need	to	make	deals	and	obtain	resources	to	
purchase	equipment,	pay	costs	and	salaries,	and	political	actors	may	mount	insurgency	or	
counter-insurgency	on	the	cheap	by	licensing	armed	units	to	loot,	pillage	and	seize	land	(as	
has	been	well	documented	in	Sudan	and	South	Sudan37).	Sustained	conflict	leads	to	war	
economies	which	invariably	accelerate	the	marketization	of	politics	(as	was	the	case	in	
Syria,	Yemen	and	South	Sudan).	Across	our	cases,	kleptocracy	and	gangsterism	also	go	
together,	as	twin	manifestations	of	transactional	politics,	and	combined	with	strategies	
such	as	asset	stripping	or	livelihood	destruction	–	create	and/or	intensify	humanitarian	
crisis.	Further,	many	of	our	cases	are	also	characterized	by	the	suspension	of	norms,	
control	over	information	flows,	and	the	manipulation	of	humanitarian	aid	(more	on	this	
below)	–	which	exacerbate	these	crises.	In	other	cases,	such	as	in	the	Kasai	region	in	the	
DRC,	mis-steps	by	political	entrepreneurs	can	lead	to	armed	violence	and	humanitarian	
crisis.38	
	
The	second	takeaway	is	that	‘political	business	as	usual’	is	an	entrenched	obstacle	to	
promoting	public	goods	including	basic	welfare	and	humanitarian	action.	Where	monetized	
transactional	politics	trumps	institutions,	we	have	a	situation	of	vulnerability	to	food	
insecurity	and	problematic	management	of	humanitarian	response.	The	functioning	of	the	
political	marketplace	means	that	necessary	macro-economic	reforms	and	institution-
building	are	either	delayed,	never	enacted,	or	reversed.	In	Yemen,	for	instance,	a	neo-
liberal	agricultural	policy	favouring	cash	crops	at	the	expense	of	staples,	was	exacerbated	
by	land	grabs,	and	the	creation	of	a	security-focused	state	which	created	a	market	for	
militarized	male	labour.39	In	Ethiopia,	a	previously	effective	humanitarian	response	system	
has	been	degraded	as	the	country’s	politics	have	become	more	transactional.	
	
Our	third	conclusion	is	that	humanitarian	operations	routinely	become	entrapped	in	the	
calculus	of	transactional	politics.	Although	humanitarian	aid	is	almost	always	a	relatively	
minor	component	of	national	economies	and	a	small	contributor	to	political	budgets,	there	
 
37	Joshua	Craze,	‘Making	Markets:	South	Sudan’s	War	Economy	in	the	21st	Century’,	Paper	prepared	for	the	
United	States	Institute	of	Peace	and	the	World	Peace	Foundation,	mimeo.			
38	Patrick	Maxwell	and	Merry	Fitzpatrick,	‘Incentives,	Violence	and	Political	Skill:	The	political	marketplace	in	
the	DRC	and	the	crisis	in	Kasai’,	forthcoming.		
39	Aditya	Sarkar	and	Sama’a	al-Hamdani,	‘“Once	we	control	them,	we	will	feed	them”:	Mass	Starvation	in	
Yemen’,	forthcoming.		
 33 
are	some	exceptions.	Somalia	is	the	principal	case:	business	fortunes	and	political	careers	
were	launched	on	the	back	of	the	massive	international	spending	in	Somalia	during	the	
UNITAF-UNOSOM	period	of	1992-94,	and	the	food	aid	delivery	contracts	of	the	2000s	also	
assisted	the	commercial	and	political	ambitions	of	some	members	of	the	elite	(who	then	
went	on	to	establish	some	of	Somalia’s	largest	commercial	conglomerates).	The	post-2011	
shift	from	food	aid	to	cash	has	altered	the	commercial	and	political	beneficiaries	of	
humanitarian	programming:	the	food	trucking	cartel	has	been	broken	and	money	transfer	
companies	are	now	the	ones	who	gain.	In	other	cases,	such	as	Kasai	in	DRC,	humanitarian	
aid	was	insignificant	in	comparison	to	mining	revenues,	and	therefore	did	not	become	part	
of	the	calculus	of	political	elites.		
	
d. Natural	Resources	
	
Three	of	the	five	CRP	countries	could	be	described	as	‘rentier’	political	markets	in	which	
the	primary	source	of	political	finance	has	been	natural	resource	revenues	(oil	in	Iraq	and	
South	Sudan,	a	variety	of	minerals	in	DRC).	In	all	cases,	control	of	land	influences	politics	
and	conflict	in	multiple	ways.	Climate	crises	and	the	exploitation	of	natural	resources	
intersect	with	transactional	politics.		
	
Rentier	states	tend	to	have	marketized	politics.	The	ability	of	a	ruler	to	allocate	
disproportionate	material	resources	that	accrue	exclusively	to	the	state	(such	as	oil	
revenues)	often	creates	a	system	in	which	intermediate	elites	compete	for	access	to	this	
largesse,	at	the	same	time	as	this	revenue	stream	(and	the	opportunities	for	issuing	major	
construction	contracts)	invites	corruption.	Oil	states	are	typically	functional,	authoritarian	
kleptocracies	or	oligopolies	in	which	political	elites	collude	enough	to	keep	the	rents	
flowing.	
	
The	three	rentier	systems	among	the	CRP	countries	(Iraq,	South	Sudan	and	DRC)	exemplify	
this	in	different	ways.	In	southern	Sudan	the	SPLM/A	used	oil	rents	to	outbid	the	regime	in	
Khartoum	for	the	loyalty	of	armed	groups	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Comprehensive	Peace	
Agreement	in	South	Sudan.40	Rents	from	natural	resources	led	to	an	‘inflationary’	political	
market	–	where	political	entrepreneurs	and	armed	groups	expect	constantly	increased	
prices	for	their	loyalty.	If	natural	resource	rents	decrease,	that	system	can	seize	up,	as	
occurred	in	South	Sudan	after	oil	production	was	shut	off	in	2012.	Oil	rents	continue	to	
underpin	the	payroll-based	patronage	system	in	Iraq.	In	Zaire	(now	DRC),	Mobutu	used	
mineral	rents	to	sustain	his	patronage	regime	and	control	over	natural	resources	has	
remained	crucial	to	the	DRC	war	economy.	During	the	second	Congo	war,	many	of	the	
 
40	Alex	de	Waal,	"When	kleptocracy	becomes	insolvent:	Brute	causes	of	the	civil	war	in	South	Sudan,"	African	
Affairs	113,	no.	452	(2014):	347-369.	
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armed	entrepreneurs	branched	out	from	looting	into	attempting	to	take	control	of,	and	
monetize	future	revenues	from	concessions	and	production	sites—selling	the	same	mineral	
licenses	to	multiple	investors.41	Even	conservation	efforts	can	get	drawn	into	the	dynamics	
of	the	political	marketplace	as	different	actors	use	them	to	control	people,	territory	and	
resources.42		
	
The	PMF	allows	for	an	analysis	of	what	we	refer	to	as	‘traumatic	decarbonization’—the	
sudden	and	unplanned	reduction	in	hydrocarbon	rents,	or	indeed,	the	reduction	in	other	
mineral/natural	resource	rents.	This	rarely	leads	to	an	immediate	change	in	the	overall	
structure	of	the	political	market,	but	can	change	elite	interactions	and	tactics,	and	shape	
the	strategies	for	the	extracting	political	finance.	In	Nigeria,	despite	the	massive	reduction	
of	oil	revenues	due	to	low	global	prices,	in	the	short	term,	the	patronage	system	and	the	use	
of	government	contracts	to	channel	rents	to	the	elite	has	continues	unabated.43	Over	the	
longer	term,	however,	and	depending	on	context,	low	commodity	prices	can	lead	to	the	
fragmentation	of	the	political	economy—this	occurred	in	Zaire	after	the	global	fall	in	
copper	prices,	forcing	Mobutu	to	shift	from	an	expansive	patronage	system,	to	one	run	on	a	
much	lower	budget.	The	change	in	the	type	of	natural	resources	underpinning	the	political	
economy	can	have	implications	for	which	elites	hold	power.	In	Sudan,	the	move	from	oil	to	
gold	as	the	principal	source	of	political	funds	has	contributed	to	the	rise	of	General	
Hemedti,	whose	forces	control	the	region	where	the	gold	mines	are	located.44	Finally,	it	is	
worth	noting	that	the	reduction	in	oil	revenues	can	also	yield	(often-transient)	space	for	
civic	action,	as	appears	to	have	occurred	in	Iraq	recently.45		
	
Climate	crisis	is	affecting	natural	resource	politics	and	the	conduct	of	transactional	politics.	
An	overarching	background	factor	is	the	precarity	which	has	resulted	from	environmental	
deprivation	or	despoilation	(whatever	its	causes)	and	which	is	a	very	long-standing	
element	in	the	societal	dynamics	and	political	economy	across	many	of	our	cases.	For	
communities	in	some	of	our	case-countries,	political	and	economic	drivers	of	resource	
expropriation,	destruction	or	competition	have	been	present	for	decades,	with	implications	
 
41	Peer	Schouten,	Kasper	Hoffmann,	and	Koen	Vlassenroot,	Congo’s	Violent	Political	Marketplace,	forthcoming.	
42	Esther	Marijnen,	Lotje	de	Vries,	and	Rosaleen	Duffy,	‘Conservation	in	violent	environments:	Introduction	to	
a	special	issue	on	the	political	ecology	of	conservation	amidst	violent	conflict,’	Political	Geography	(2020),	,	
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102253.  
43	Jared	Miller,	‘The	Politics	of	an	Oil	Crash:	How	the	2020	Oil	Shock	affected	Political	Settlements	in	Nigeria	
and	Implications	for	Future	Shocks,’		Paper	prepared	for	the	United	States	Institute	of	Peace	and	the	World	
Peace	Foundation,	mimeo.	
44	Alex	de	Waal,	Sudan:	A	political	marketplace	framework	analysis,	World	Peace	Foundation	and	Conflict	
Research	Programme	Occasional	Paper	No.	19,	August	2019.	See	also	Luke	Patey,	‘Oil,	Gold,	and	Guns:	The	
violent	politics	of	Sudan’s	resource	booms,’	Paper	prepared	for	the	United	States	Institute	of	Peace	and	the	
World	Peace	Foundation,	mimeo.		
45	Shahla	Al-Kli,	‘Decarbonization	and	fragility	in	Iraq:	Impact	on	politics,	society,	and	regional	relations,’	
Paper	prepared	for	the	United	States	Institute	of	Peace	and	the	World	Peace	Foundation,	mimeo.	
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comparable	to	the	current	and	projected	impacts	of	climate	crisis.	There	are	no	simple	
cause-and-effect	conclusions,	and	there	are	some	unexpected	climate/environment-related	
intrusions	into	political	processes.	
	
Intercommunal	conflict	over	scarce	resources	has	been	a	longstanding	feature	of	many	
countries.	This	has	been	the	case	particularly	in	the	Horn	of	Africa	where	changes	in	the	
political	economy,	crisis	in	pastoral	livelihoods,	and	environmental	pressures	have	been	
deliberately	exacerbated	or	exploited	by	political	entrepreneurs	to	cling	to	power.	Siyad	
Barre’s	regime	in	Somalia	provides	an	excellent	example,	where	localized	conflict	were	
manipulated,	exploited	and	amplified	as	Siyad	Barre	sought	to	minimize	challenges	to	his	
rule.46	Similar	dynamics	were	observable	in	Darfur,	where	the	conflict	resulted	from	
interlocking	factors	including	environmental	pressure,	climate	shocks,	and	political	
interventions	that	dismantled	established	mechanisms	for	managing	such	pressures	and	
instead	exacerbated	them.47	Other	points	of	intersection	between	political	markets	and	
natural	resources	include	the	implications	for	food	insecurity	(see	the	section	on	
humanitarianism,	above),	the	impacts	of	investments	in	commercial	agriculture	and	
transnational	land	banking	(both	nationally,	and	from	other	states	–	such	as	the	Gulf	States	
in	South	Sudan,	Sudan	and	Ethiopia),	conflict	over	water	resources	(such	as	the	current	
impasse	between	Egypt,	Sudan	and	Ethiopia	over	the	construction	the	Grand	Ethiopian	
Renaissance	Dam).	Finally,	development	interventions	which	are	inattentive	to	the	ways	
that	natural	resources	and	climate	crises	are	closely	tied	up	to	political	marketplace	
dynamics	can	end	up	becoming	part	of	those	dynamics.		
	
e. Mediation	and	Peace	Processes	
 
Peace	processes,	and	mediation	efforts	more	specifically,	are	frequent	external	
interventions	in	political	marketplaces.	They	signify	openings,	however	small,	for	outsiders	
to	influence	political	market	dynamics	precisely	because	the	conflict	parties	have	allowed	
in	external	actors;	influence,	though,	can	be	positive	or	negative.	The	primary	challenge,	
then,	for	external	actors	trying	to	promote	peace,	a	political	settlement	or	post-conflict	
reconstruction	is	an	analytical	one:	to	understand	the	system	for	what	it	actually	is	and	
match	that	with	what	is	achievable	given	the	limited	tools	of	the	mediator.		The	PMF	equips	
mediators	to	do	this.	It	provides	an	analytical	framework	to	assess	what	they’re	up	against,	
the	factors	driving	change,	and	dangers	that	may	arise	from	orthodox	approaches	to	
peacemaking.	In	the	best	cases,	this	allows	the	mediator	to	make	incremental	progress	to	
 
46	Nisar	Majid,	et	al,.	'Somalia's	Politics:	Business	as	Usual,'	forthcoming.	See	also	Alex	de	Waal,	‘Somalia’s	
disassembled	state:	clan	unit	formation	and	the	political	marketplace,’	Conflict,	Security,	and	Development	
20(5):	561-585.	
47	See	Alex	de	Waal	(ed.)	War	in	Darfur	and	the	Search	for	Peace,	Cambridge	MA,	Harvard	University	Press.		
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move	the	political	market	toward	less	or	non-violent	means	of	political	contestation,	
establish	more	peaceable	relations	among	the	parties,	and	create	conditions	so	that	local	
civic	coalitions	can	work	toward	more	ambitious	gains.		
	
This	is	illustrated	through	six	broader	points	on	peace	processes	in	political	marketplaces.	
Despite	challenges,	peace	talks	remain	important.	They	provide	a	political	framework	for	a	
multilateral	presence	in	conflict	areas	and,	as	such,	are	crucial	for	all	external	
interventions.	Peace	conferences	can	become	an	alternative	arena	for	political	contestation,	
thereby	reducing	violence.	It	is	just	that	they	need	to	be	thought	of	as	an	ongoing	process	
(perhaps	punctuated	by	agreements	on	specific	issues),	building	relational	contracts	
among	the	parties	or	providing	a	forum	in	which	radical	disagreements	can	be	argued	over	
indefinitely,	rather	than	aiming	at	a	decisive	once-and-for-all	settlement.	
		
1) 	Peace	agreements	are	not	“end	points”	and	not	necessarily	reflective	of	political	
settlements	
	
Principal	dangers	of	peacemaking	orthodoxy	are	the	embedded	assumptions	that	a	peace	
agreement	is	an	end	in	and	of	itself	and	that	the	formal	peace	deal	will	map	1-1	onto	the	
often	less	formal	political	settlements—the	deals	among	members	of	the	elite	on	
distributions	of	power.	Rather,	peace	agreements—and	peace	processes	more	broadly—
should	be	understood	in	the	context	of	these	ongoing	intra-elite	bargaining	relationships,	
which	can	shape	and	be	shaped	by	formal	peace	processes.	For	example,	in	southern	
Sudan/South	Sudan,	politics	have	been	shaped	by	both	past	peace	processes	and	
agreements	and	the	anticipated	structure	of	future	peace	processes,	especially	their	
attendant	security	arrangements.	Armed	groups	can	be	formed	in	response	to	and	
legitimized	by	peace	processes,	which	also	influence	how	these	groups	negotiate,	align	and	
merge	with	each	other.48	Peace	processes,	too,	have	also	been	partially	responsible	for	
structuring	conflict	along	ethno-territorial	lines.49	Similar	dynamics	have	been	observed	in	
the	DRC.50		
	
Beyond	this,	peace	agreements	and	may—or	may	not—reflect	an	underlying	political	
settlement.	Indeed,	a	peace	agreement	which	is	widely	lauded	by	international	
policymakers	may	have	nothing	to	do	with	a	new	political	settlement	or	an	elite	pact.	It	
may,	in	fact,	disguise	the	‘actual’	political	bargain	which	(a)	begins	to	take	shape	prior	to	
 
48	Alan	Boswell,	Nanaho	Yamanaka,	Aditya	Sarkar,	and	Alex	de	Waal.	2019.	“The	Security	Arena	in	South	
Sudan:	A	Political	Marketplace	Study.”	December.	London:	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	
and	Medford,	MA:	World	Peace	Foundation.	
49	Though	there	are	other	reasons	for	the	ethno-territorial	manifestation	of	conflict	in	South	Sudan,	including	
the	tactics	of	counter-insurgency	which	were	employed	by	the	government	in	Khartoum.		
50	Judith	Verweijen,	2016.	‘Stable	Instability:	Political	settlements	and	armed	groups	in	the	Congo,’	London,	
Nairobi:	Rift	Valley	Institute.	
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the	formal	peace	deal	and	(b)	is	then	manifested	in	prevarication	and	continual	
renegotiation	by	parties	during	the	implementation	of	the	peace	deal.		The	externally-
mediated	Agreement	on	the	Resolution	of	the	Conflict	in	South	Sudan	(ARCSS)	is	a	case	in	
point.	It	was	significantly	out-of-step	with	the	‘real’	political	dynamics	in	South	Sudan,	
when	it	was	signed	in	2015.	Rather	than	reflecting	the	elite	compact,	it	created	the	façade	
of	a	cooperative	arrangement	behind	which	the	armed	belligerents	continued	to	
consolidate	their	positions	through	tactical	manoeuvres.	The	deal	collapsed	in	the	face	of	
violence	between	the	major	armed	groups	in	July	2016.51			
	
2) 	Peace	processes	and	mediation	efforts	are	unlikely	to	transform	political	
marketplaces	
	
External	interventions	are	unlikely	to	fundamentally	change	the	nature	of	politics	in	
political	marketplaces,	and	peace	processes	are	no	exception.	The	rules	of	the	game	are	
sticky.	These	are	contexts	where	political	unsettlement	and	ungovernance	prevail52—
models	of	political	organization	where	legal	and	bureaucratic	structures	and	frameworks	
kept	issues	in	suspense	by	design—and	where	formal,	legal	institutions	are	substantively	
absent.	Even	when	formal	institutions	of	government	resemble	their	counterparts	in	
institutionalized	political	systems	(‘isomorphic	mimicry’53),	they	are	subordinate	to	the	
logic	of	the	political	marketplace.		
	
3) The	way	in	which	the	mediator	structures	the	process	has	consequences	and	risks	
	
The	PMF	surfaces	the	tensions	inherent	in,	and	consequences	of,	the	formal	structure	that	
peace	processes	inherently	impose.	This	is	particularly	visible	in	who	is	part	of	the	process	
and	what	is	under	discussion,	both	made	more	legible	through	a	political	marketplace	lens.		
	
Any	peace	process	must	address	organized	violence.	To	do	so,	it	determines	what	kinds	of	
violence	(by	who	and	against	whom)	matters—and	by	implication,	what	kinds	of	violence	
‘don’t	matter’	(or	don’t	matter	so	much).	The	next	step	is	a	ceasefire,	that	specifically	
recognizes	organized	armed	groups	perpetuating	violence	that	‘matters’	and	those	actors	
 
51	Alan	Boswell,	Nanaho	Yamanaka,	Aditya	Sarkar,	and	Alex	de	Waal.	2019.	“The	Security	Arena	in	South	
Sudan:	A	Political	Marketplace	Study.”	December.	London:	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	
and	Medford,	MA:	World	Peace	Foundation.	
52	Christine	Bell	and	Jan	Pospisil,	‘Navigating	Inclusion	in	Transitions	from	Conflict:	The	Formalised	Political	
Unsettlement’,	Journal	of	International	Development,	29(5)	(2017),	576–593;	Jan	Pospisil,	Peace	in	Political	
Unsettlement:	Beyond	solving	conflict	(London,	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2019);	Christine	Bell	(2020)	‘It’s	law	Jim,	
but	not	as	we	know	it’:	the	public	law	techniques	of	ungovernance,	Transnational	Legal	Theory,	11:3,	300-328,	
DOI:	10.1080/20414005.2020.1835261		
53	Greg	Larson,	Peter	Biar	Ajak	and	Lant	Pritchett,	2013.	‘South	Sudan’s	Capability	Trap:	Building	a	state	with	
disruptive	innovation,’	Harvard	University	Kennedy	School	of	Government,	Center	for	International	
Development	Working	Paper	no	268,	October.	
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who	control	territory.	Without	their	buy-in	the	process	is	a	non-starter,	but	this	privileges	
these	actors	over	others	and	can	result	in	peace	agreements	that	are	pacts	to	exclude	
certain	actors.	This	formula	can	also	shape	future	violence	that	is	organized	in	anticipation	
of	a	future	political	resolution	(i.e.,	as	others	commit	precisely	the	kind	of	violence	that	the	
mediator	wishes	to	stop,	because	this	gets	them	a	seat	at	the	table	and	share	of	the	gains).	
Thus,	the	template	for	peace	can	determine	contours	of	the	war,	which	often	have	
devastating	consequences	for	civilians.		
	
Based	on	this,	there	is	general	consensus	that	inclusivity	in	peace	processes—beyond	those	
who	control	territory	and	the	means	of	violence—is	categorically	positive.		However,	there	
is	a	risk	that	by	bringing	in	a	wide	variety	of	actors,	the	mediator	is	effectively	creating	a	
new	venue	for	political	market	deals.	That	is,	the	new	structure	imposed	on	the	national	
actors	presents	opportunities	for	dealmaking	as	the	more	powerful	political	economic	
actors	coerce,	co-opt	or	buy	off	the	less	powerful	actors,	who	in	effect	become	proxies	in	
the	peace	process.	
	
4) Reducing	violence	is	achievable		
	
Even	if	external	interventions	cannot	fundamentally	transform	political	systems,	pursuing	
the	shorter-term	goal	of	significantly	reducing	violence	is	still	worthwhile	and	can—
potentially—pave	the	way	for	larger	successes	by	building	stronger	and	more	peaceable	
relationships	among	the	participants.	This	more	modest	goal	of	shifting	from	mostly	violent	
transactions	to	more	stable	(and	somewhat	peaceable)	collaborations54	does	not	require	
structural	reconfiguration	to	achieve	success.	A	peace	process	may	achieve	such	a	
reduction	in	itself,	simply	by	dint	of	providing	an	alternative	forum	for	political	
contestation.	It	is	notable	that	in	some	peace	processes,	the	period	of	negotiation	is	itself	
characterised	by	reduced	violence.	However,	as	talks	approach	a	definitive	conclusion	or	
when	they	exclude	certain	actors,	they	may	incentivize	increases	in	violence.		
	
Moreover,	two	elements	in	the	‘final’	deal	are	critical,	given	that	actors	in	turbulent	political	
marketplaces	have	low	expectations	that	relationships	will	become	consistently	
trustworthy	and	non-violent.	First,	the	parties	to	the	agreement	need	to	have	an	
expectation	that	the	arrangement	will	endure.	Peacemakers	are	professional	optimists,	but	
the	record	of	peace	agreements	falling	apart	after	a	few	months	or	years	suggests	that	we	
need	to	assume	that	the	protagonists	are	working	on	the	assumption	that	a	relapse	into	
armed	conflict	is		possible.	Given	the	very	high	costs	of	miscalculating	on	this	score,	we	
 
54	Alex	de	Waal,	Aditya	Sarkar,	Sarah	Detzner	and	Benjamin	Spatz.	2020.	“A	Theory	of	Change	for	Violent	
Political	Marketpalces”	February.	London:	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	and	Medford,	
MA:	World	Peace	Foundation.	Ian	Johnstone,	2011.	‘Managing	Consent	in	Contemporary	Peacekeeping	
Operations’,	International	Peacekeeping,	18.2,	168-182,	pp.	172-3.	
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should	assume	that	parties	to	an	agreement	will	keep	escape	options	open,	probably	
secretly.	Second,	the	arrangement	itself	needs	to	be	structured	such	that	it	encompasses	
not	only	what	the	parties	agreed	to	at	the	time	of	signing,	but	also	uncertain	future	
contingencies	and	the	possibility	that	parties’	expectations	will	evolve	over	time.	For	
instance,	a	peace	agreement	may	include	(a)	mechanisms	which	allow	parties	to	co-exist	
despite	fundamental	disagreements,	or	without	resolving	the	issues	that	led	to	conflict	in	
the	first	place,	(b)	vaguely	worded	provisions	which	can	act	as	a	basis	for	future	advocacy	
or	action,	and	(c)	the	possibility	for	local	issues	to	be	settled	outside	the	agreement	or	
peace	process	at	the	national	level.55						
	
5) Beware	of	hubris	
	
Classic	mediation	strategy	begins	with	identifying	the	principal	belligerents	and	seeking	
agreement	between/among	them,	using	incentives	and	pressure	to	make	peace	more	
attractive.	No	matter	the	depth	of	skillful	analysis,	mediators	will	never	understand	these	
systems	as	well	as	those	who	are	part	of	them;	national	actors	are	invariably	better-
informed	and	more	adept.	Additionally,	external	actors	often	have	competing	goals	and	
strategies—as	is	the	case	in	most	of	the	greater	Middle	East	today—tipping	the	scales	
further	in	favour	of	national	actors.	Therefore	mediators	must	resist	the	temptation	to	use	
more	precise	sticks	and	different	varieties	of	carrots	try	to	game	the	political	market	to	
their	advantage,	because	it	is	unlikely	that	they	will	succeed.	Instead,	they	may	be	better	
served	by	aiming	to	achieve	relatively	limited	goals.	The	relevant	question	here	is:	given	
the	logics	of	change	in	political	markets,	what	short	term	tactical	bargains	between	conflict	
actors	could	help	control	levels	of	outright	violence?	In	2003,	for	instance,	a	two-year	
interim	government	was	formed	under	the	aegis	of	the	mediated	peace	agreement	in	
Liberia.	Almost	all	government	positions	were	distributed	among	the	different	fighting	
factions	with	the	expectation	that	even	if	large	scale	corruption	were	to	take	place	over	the	
two-year	period,	many	of	those	who	were	part	of	the	interim	government	would	not	be	
able	to	participate	in	future	elections	under	the	terms	of	the	peace	deal.	While	this	did	not	
operate	in	isolation—and	a	large	UN	mission,	the	departure	of	Charles	Taylor	for	Nigeria	
and	simple	conflict	fatigue	may	each	have	played	a	role—violence	did	largely	stop.					
	
	
	
	
 
55	This	has	been	referred	to	as	the	process	of	reaching	a	‘formalised	political	unsettlement’	by	Bell	and	
Pospisil.	See	Bell	and	Pospisil,	op.	cit..	For	an	application	of	this	context	in	South	Sudan	see:	Alex	de	Waal,	Alan	
Boswell,	David	Deng,	Rachel	Ibreck,	Matthew	Benson	and	Jan	Pospisil,	2019.	South	Sudan:	The	politics	of	delay.	
Conflict	Research	Programme	Memo,	December	3.	http://www.politicalsettlements.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/Politics-of-Delay-South-Sudan-3Dec19.pdf.			
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6) Mediators	will	be	manipulated	
	
Conflict	parties	only	allow	in	peacemakers/mediators	when	they	believe	it	is	in	their	
interest	to	do	so.	Often	this	reflects	a	feeling	that	the	external	actors	can	be	manipulated.	
This	might	mean	that	a	party	to	the	conflict	believes	they	can	manipulate	the	external	
actors	to	benefit	them	singularly	at	the	expense	of	their	competitors.	In	other	cases,	the	
external	intervention	might	create	incentives	for	conflict	parties	to	work	together—
temporarily—to	secure	a	better	arrangement	while	waiting	out	the	external	intervention.	
Manipulation	peace	processes	by	belligerents	seeking	advantages	is	nothing	new	and	
mediators	are	well	aware	of	it.	The	PMF	provides	a	roadmap	of	to	better	understand	how	
manipulation	might	occur	and	to	either	mitigate	negative	effects	or,	at	least,	not	be	taken	
off	guard.	
 
 
 
 
